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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
ALFRED D. PEHRSON and
RHEA B. PEHRSON,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

vs.

Case No.

BOYD C. SADERUP, MADELINE
SADERUP and BRUCE
SADERUP,
Defendants-Respondents.
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RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
STATE1\1ENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE
This is an action to recover treble damages under
Section 78-38-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, for injury to realty resulting from the cutting of lilac bushes
growing thereon.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The trial court awarded Plaintiffs nominal damages which it fixed at $50.00 and then trebled making
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judgment for Plaintiffs and against Defendants for
$150.00 and costs.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants seek affirmance of the judgment of
the trial court except as to the trebling of damages, and
on cross-appeal seek reversal of the judgment trebling
damages.

STATE1\1ENT OF FACTS
Defendants controvert the statement of facts set
forth in Plaintiffs' Brief. The following statements
made therein are inconsistent with the facts:
Plaintiffs' Brief states that the back yard of plaintiffs' property was well and gracefully landscaped. The
record contains no evidence as to the quality of the landscapmg.
Plaintiffs' Brief states that the lilacs were cut off
at the ground. The record shows that the lilacs were cut
approximately a foot from the ground (Transcript page
14, lines 4-5) .
Plaintiffs' Brief states that the Defendant Bruce
Saderup admitted cutting the lilacs without any verification as to the property line. The record shows that he
measured the property (Transcript pages 49, lines 2228), that he located a rebar which he believed marked
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the property line (Transcript page 46, lines 21-25; page
48, lines 10-14), that the lilacs were growing on the west
side of an irrigabon ditch which appeared to be the
property line (Transcript page 46, lines 4-13), that there
was a fence on the east side of said ditch along the next
lot south of plaintiffs' property (Transcript page 46,
line 16-18 and line 29) , and the lilacs were hanging over
in defendants' parking lot (Transcript page 45, lines
29-30).

Plaintiffs' Brief states that the lilacs would replace themselves with common lilacs and not French
hybrid lilacs. Plaintiffs' expert testified that he did not
examine the lilacs closely enough to tell whether the new
growth would be common lilacs or French hybrid lilacs
(Transcript page 31, lines 3-11; page 32, lines 8-11).
Plaintiffs' Brief states that in addition to the cost
of purchasing replacement lilacs it would cost $50.00
each per clump to prepare the soil and plant them. Plaintiffs' expert testified that it would cost $50.00 to do
the entire job of prepar:ng the soil and replanting
(Transcript page 31, lines 25-27; page 36, lines 27 and
fallowing) .
Plaintiffs' Brief states that before the trial the
court indicated the case would be tr:ed on the theory of
Brereton vs. Dixon. This statement is not supported by
the record. The Court did, however, call that case to the
attention of counsel for their consideration as to its applicability.
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Plaintiffs' Brief states that the evidence presented
would sustain a judgment of actual damages of from
$2,000.00 to $2,400.00. Plaintiffs' expert testified that
he could not plant more than seven clumps of mature
lilacs in the area damaged (Transcript page 34, lines
20-30; page 35, l;nes 9-12). Even at plaintiffs' values
of $100.00 per clump and $50.00 for planting, Plaintiffs are far short of the amount stated.
Plaintiffs' Brief repeatedly refers to the lilacs as
trees. Plaintiffs' expert testified that normally lilacs
are considered shrubs (Transcript page 35, line 21-22,
28-30) and that in his literature they are classified as
shrubs (Transcript page 36, lines 22-24).
Defendants agree with the statement of facts set
forth in Plaintiffs' Brief insofar as it is there shown
that Plaintiffs owned real property fronting on Univers:ty Avenue and Defendants owned real property
fronting on First West Street in Provo, Utah; that
the west line of Plaintiffs' property and the east line
of Defendants' property where their back yards came
together were partially adjoining; and that on or near
the adjoining property lines lilacs were growing across
the '''est end of Plaintiffs' property which were approximately 15 feet high and probably 35 or 36 years
old. Also, that for a distance of 42 feet across Plaintiffs' property (Transcript page 55, lines 8-12) the
flacs were cut approximately one foot from the ground
by the defendant Bruce Saderup, acting as the agent
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of the defendant Boyd C. Saderup. It is noted that
plaintiff Alfred D. Pehrson testified that sixteen
clumps of lilacs were cut, but that the photograph of
the new growth on the lilacs (Defendants' exhibit no.
6) shows there were probably less than that number,
perhaps seven clumps.
To the foregoing facts it should be added that the
defendant Bruce Saderup believed the lilacs were on
h; s fa ther' s property when he cut them (Transcript page
52, line 12-14), that he believed the irrigation ditch on
the east side of the lilacs was the property line (Transcript page 46, line 4-13), that his observations of the
physical characteristics of the rear yards led him to believe the ditch was the property line (Transcript page
46, lines 14-30), and that he believed he had located the
property line by measurement (Transcript page 49,
lines 22-28; page 50, lines 1-.5). Also, it is to be noted
that the lilacs were not destroyed, but had replaced themselves to the heighth of a man's head by the date of the
trial (Transcript page 58, lines 13-23, and Defendants'
exhibit no. 6) ; and that given time they would completely replace themselves (Transcript page 31, line 3;
page 39, lines 5-7).
The testimony further shows that the Plaintiff Alfred D. Pehrson was a resident of Monticello, Utah
(Transcript page 11, line 14) and had lived there most
of his life (Transcript page 19, lines 2-5) ; that he
ncquired the Provo property for his children to live in
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while attending the University because he could not rent
units for them (Transcript page 23, lines 29-30; page
24, lines 1-3) ; that he did not intend to occupy the property as his residence (Transcript page 23, line 29) ; that
at the time the lilacs were cut he \vas renting the property to college girls; that none of his family were living
there at that time; and that none of his family had lived
there since the injury (Transcript page 24, lines 19-26).
The Plaintiff also testified that he came up to the
property in Provo rather infrequently (Transcript page
13, lines 15-19; page 21, lines 9-13), that the property
had not been kept up as well after he purchased it as
it was before (Transcript page 24, lines 13-16), that
he had done nothing since the lilacs were cut in July,
1970 to restore the privacy which was afforded the property by the lilacs (Transcript page 25, lines 21-30).
Plaintiff was letting the lilacs grow back and replace
themselves.
ARGU_MENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD
THAT THE :MEASURE OF
IN
THIS CASE WAS THE DIFFERENCE IN
THE VALUE OF TlIE REALTY JUST BEFORE AND JUST AFTER THE INJURY,
AND THAT TIIERE \VAS NO EVIDENCE
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PRESENTED UPON 'VHICH THE COURT
COULD APPLY THAT RULE.
By the great weight of authority, the proper measure of damages for the destruction of or injury to ornamental trees and shrubs is the difference in the value
of the land just before and just after the injury. Although this rule is not exclusive, and the cases show
an intention to give due regard to all the circumstances,
most courts have decided that the before-and-after test
usually best compensates an owner for his loss. The rationale for such decisions being that ornamental trees
and shrubs generally have no separable and independent
value apart from the land; and the value of such trees
and shrubs results from their relation to the property
to which they are connected and wh;ch they ornament.
The many cases on this subject are brought together in
the annotation: "JJi easure of damages for destruction or
injury to trees and shrubbery, 161 ALR 549, page 598
under heading V, "Shade and ornamental trees and
shrubs"; the annotation supplemental thereto in 69
ALR 2d 1335, page 1366 under heading IV, "Shade
and ornamental trees and shrubs"; the ALR 2d Later
Case Service for 69 ALR 2d at pages 417-418, sections
15 and 16; and the 1971 pocket part thereto at page llO,
section 15 and 16.
Under appropriate circumstances, such as where
trees have a calculable value separate from the land,

some courts have held that the measure of damages can
also be the value of the trees destroyed or injured. This
rule was adopted and applied to economically productive
fruit trees in the Utah case of Brereton v. Dixon, 20
Utah 2d 64, 433 P 2d 3. 'Vhile fruit, nut and other
productive trees may have a calculable value separate
from the land, and while trees suitable for timber or
nursery stock can have a market value; the ornamental
lilac bushes in this case have no such calculable value or
market value. The value of these shrubs results from the
added value which they give to the realty of which they
are a part, and such value is properly measured by the
difference in the value of that realty just before and
just after the injury.
Plaintiffs presented no evidence that the lilacs had
a market value, they presented no evidence from which
a value for the lilacs separate from the land could be
calculated, and they presented no evidence as to the
value of the realty before and after the injury. Plaintiffs' evidence attempted to show the cost of restoring
the premises. The question, therefore, is whether or not
in this case the cost of restoration is a proper measure of
damages.
In a few cases, but again only under appropriate
circumstances, the courts have held that where ornamental trees and shrubs had been injured or destroyed
the injured party could recover the fair or reasonable
cost of restoring the prem;ses upon which they stood
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to a reasonable approximation of the former condition.
The circumstances under which the courts have deemed
it appropriate to apply this measure of damages are
those where it was shown by the evidence that the injured trees or shrubs had a peculiar value to the owner,
that there were reasons personal to the owner for restoring the premises, and that restoration was necessary
to the use or planned use of the property. The court
found such circumstances to exist in the case of J'l aloof
v. U.S. (D.C. lVId) 242 F Supp 175, where there was
damage to ornamental trees, shrubs and formal gardens.
The evidence showed that there were reasons personal
to the owner for restoring the property inasmuch as he
had established a cultural center where artists could congregate and he could display art treasures and have a
private museum, and that the plantings were of paramount importance to his plans. Again, in the case of
Huber v. Serpico, 71 NJ Super 329, 176 A 2d 805, the
court allowed as damages the fair cost of restoring the
property to a reasonable approximation of its former
condition where it found that the shade and ornamental
trees had a peculiar value to the landowner. In this case
the court found that the premises were occup;ed by the
lando,vner as his residence and the wooded area injured
possessed a peculiar aesthetic and ornamental quality
insofar as plaintiff's enjoyment of it was concerned.
The court arrived at a similar decis;on in the case of

Samson Construction Co. v. Brusowankin, 218 Md 458,
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147 A 2d 430, 69 ALR 2d 1326, which case also collects and cites a number of other cases relating to the
same subject. In that case, lots which had been bought
and held by plaintiffs' as sites for their homes because
of the beautiful shade trees on them were injured by
removal of the trees. The court found that the plaintiffs
had reasons personal to them for restoring the lots as
nearly as possible to their original condition, and that
such restoration was necessary to plaintiffs' planned use
of the property. In another case where the presence of
trees was found to be essential to the planned use of the
property for a homesite in accordance with the taste
and wishes of the owners, the court stated that the owner
could be awarded as damages the fair cost of restoring
his land to a reasonable approximation of its former condition, if such restoration was practical. Thatcher v. Lane
Constnwtion Co., 21 Ohio App 2d 41, 50 Ohio Ops 2d
95, 254 NE 2d 703.
In the instant case, the plaintiff Alfred D. Pehrson testified that he never intended to occupy the premises as his residence (Transcript page 23, line 29), that
he purchased it so his children could have a place to live
while attending the University in Provo because he could
not rent units for them (Transcript page 23, lines 29-30;
page 24, lines 1-3), that at the time of the injury the
property was being rented to college girls (Transcript
page 24, lines 20-22) , that he resided in l\1onticello,
Utah, and only came up occasionally to look after the
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property (Transcript page 13, lines 15-19; page 21,
lines 9-13), and that he had done nothing in over a year
to restore the privacy which the lilacs afforded the property (Transcript page 25, lines 21-30). It appears that
he was content to let the lilacs grow back and replace
themselves. There is no evidence showing that plaintiffs
had reasons personal to themselves for restoring the
premises, or even that they intended to restore the same;
no evidence that restoration was necessary to their use
or any planned use of the property; and no evidence
that the lilac bushes had any peculiar or unique value
to the plaintiffs personally. On the other hand, the evidence shows that plaintiffs were absentee landlords who
held the property as a rental unit at the time of the injury, and the record shows no intentions on the part of
plaintiffs to change that use. The value of the property to the plaintiffs is basically economic. The property is an investment, an income producing asset. Under
these circumstances, it is respectfully submitted that the
measure of damages is not the cost of restoration, but
rather the depreciation in the value of the realty caused
by the injury; and that the depreciated value is properly
measured by the difference in the value of the realty
just before and just after the injury as was held by the
trial court in this case.
Defendants acknowledge that where property has
been injured or destroyed by a wrongful act, the desired
objectiYe is to ascertain as accurately as possible the
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amount of money that will fairly and adequately compensate the owner for his loss. Nevertheless, this determination must be made pursuant to proper rules of
law for measuring such damages, and upon proper facts
pleaded and proved in the action. For the reasons stated
above, the rule for measuring damages contended for by
plaintiffs in this case is not applicable. The facts and
circumstances under which the courts have awarded
costs of restoration as damages in the few cases where
that rule was found to be appropriate were neither alleged or proved by the plaintiffs in this case. And even
were the rule applicable, the amount of damages sought
would be unfair and unreasonable. Plaintiffs' expert
clearly testified that no more than seven clumps of mature lilacs could be replaced in the area in which the
lilacs were injured (Transcript page 34, lines 20-30;
page 35, lines 9-12). And even at the replacement cost
stated by plaintiffs' expert, the price of seven clumps
of lilacs falls far short of the damages sought. Furthermore, the possibility of restoration using mature lilacs
would appear impractical if not impossible. Plaintiffs'
expert testified that in all his experience he had never
purchased a lilac of the size needed, and in fact that he
hadn't been able to (Transcript page 32, lines 27-28).
He also stated that such lilacs were not grown by nurserymen or sold on the market, and would have to be
acquired from some location such as plaintiffs' premises; presumably from someone who didn't want them
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and was willing to sell. (Transcript page 33, lines 1-6) .
The likelihood of acquiring such lilacs appears extremely remote; and the cost of acquisition testified to by
plaintiffs' expert was pure guesswork by his own admission (Transcript page 32, lines 24-26), the actual
costs lying outside his experience and apparently outside his knowledge. An award of damages should not
be based on this type of speculation or uncertainty.
Plaintiffs were afforded the opportunity to present their contentions to the trial court, and none of the
evidence which they offered was excluded. They elected
not to present evidence as to the value of the realty before and after the injury, and they offered no evidence
that the lilacs had a market value or a value calculable
separate and apart from the land. Plaintiffs further
failed to establish by their evidence the circumstances
required by the courts where restoration costs have been
made a proper measure of damages, to-wit: that the injured shrubs had a peculiar or unique value to them, that
they had personal reasons for wanting to restore the
premises, and that restoration was necessary to their use
or planned use of the property. Nor did plaintiffs show
that it was practical or possible to restore the realty to
a reasonable approximation of its former condition at
a reasonable and fair cost, or establish the restoration
costs with any degree of certa:nty. They should not
now be heard to complain because the trial court award-

ed them only nominal damages. The judgment of the
trial court on this point should be affirmed.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TREBLING THE M10UNT OF DAMAGES ASSESSED IN THIS CASE.
Treble damages are highly penal, and even where
provided for by statute should be awarded only where
the wrongdoer intentionally acts wilfully, wantonly or
maliciously. In this case the trial court found that there
was no evidence that the cutting of the lilacs was wi]f ull, wanton or malicious (Findings of Fact No. 4) ;
and that the Defendants' mistakenly thought said lilacs
were growing on their property (Findings of Fact No.
5).
In discussing the question of a defendant's purpose
or intent as effecting the recovery of multiple damages
for trespassing, it is stated in 52 Am J ur 2d, Logs and
Timber, section 136 at page 102, that "In a number of
jurisdictions, although the statute contains no express
provision, the courts have recognized that the cutting
or carrying away of trees must contain an element of
wilfullness to render the trespasser liable for increased
damages or the prescribed penalty." The Arkansas court
in construing that state's statute in Callazcay v. Perdue,
238 Ark 652, 385 S"'V 2d 4, 13 ALR 3d 1300, at pages
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1308-1309 of the ALR 3d report, stated that "It is true
that our statutes relative to treble damages (the pertinent parts of which have already been quoted in Footnote 3) does not actually use any words which require
the trespasser to hold an evil intent or act in bad faith
before being liable for the penalty. Yet, our cases make
clear that a necessary element to justify treble damages
is intent of wrongdoing, though such intent may be inf erred from the carelessness, recklessness, or negligence
of the offending party."
Again, in 52 Am J ur 2d, Logs and Timber, section
137 at page 103, it is stated that "It is generally held
that where timber is cut or carried away under a bona
fide mistake of fact, as, for example, where the trespasser believes that he is on his own land or the lands
of another upon which he is authorized to go, the penalty
statutes do not apply, eYen though they contain no exculpatory provisions." Cases holding that where a trespass is the result of a bona fide mistake of fact the
multiple damage and penalty statutes do not apply are
collected in an annotation found in 111 ALR 79, under
heading IV, subsection (a) at page 92 collecting cases
under statutes containing no exculpatory provisions,
and subsection (b) at page 94 collect:ng cases under
statutes containing exculpatory provisions.
The evidence in this case showed no bad faith or
evil intent on the part of the defendants in cutting the
lilac bushes. On the other hand the evidence does show
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that there was a mistake in concluding that an irrigation ditch was the boundary line between the parties'
properties, and that the defendant Bruce Saderup
thought the lilacs were growing on his father's property
when he cut them. Defendants are aware that there are
cases which have trebled damages where there was no
showing of bad faith or evil intent. Nevertheless, defendants would urge the court to follow the rule requiring a showing of wilfulness, wantoness or maliciousness
before the highly penal provisions of Section 78-38-3,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, are made applicable. Defendants would further urge the court to follow the rule
making a defendant liable only for damages actually
proved and not treble damages under the statute where
the injury to trees results from a bona fide mistake of
fact such as a mistake as to the position of the boundary
line.
In addition to the foregoing, there is reason to believe that the statute trebling damages may not be applicable in this case if the lilacs are considered shrubs
(which is their proper classification) and the statute is
strictly construed because of its highly penal nature.
The terms "wood" and "underwood" do not necessarily
include shrubs when construed in the context of the
statute. Section 78-38-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
would appear to be concerned primarily with trees as its
heading indicates. The provisions of the statute first
deal with the "cutting down" or "carrying off" of any
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wood or underwood, tree or timber, and then cover the
"girdling" or "otherwise injuring" of any tree or timber. The terms "girdling" or "otherwise injuring" are
applicable only to trees or timber, while the term "cutting down" is made applicable to any wood or underwood, tree or timber; but "cutting down" would seem
to relate to the destruction of the underwood, tree or
timber rather than just injury to it. In this case the
lilac bushes were severly pruned to within a foot of the
ground, but were not destroyed. In time they would replace themselves, but trees obviously do not replace
themselves when cut down. It is the term "otherwise
injures" that is appropriate to the cutting of the lilacs
in this case, but under the statute that term is applicable
only to trees or timber and not to wood or underwood.
CONCLUSION
The trial court was correct in holding that in this
case the proper measure of damages was the difference
in the value of the realty just before and just after the
injury, and that there was no evidence presented upon
which the court could apply that rule. Plaintiffs having
failed to prove the amount of their actual damages by
proper evidence, the trial court properly a warded nominal damages to Plaintiff's. The judgment of the trial
court in that respect should be affirmed.
The trebling of damages by the trial court under the
provisions of Section 78-38-3, Utah Code Annotated,
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1953, where there is reason to question the applicability

of that statute to this case, where no evidence was shown
that the cutting of the lilac bushes was wilfull, wanton
or malicious, and where the defendants mistakenly
though that the lilacs were growing on their property,
was not proper. In that respect, the judgment of the
trial court should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
Robert J. Sumsion for
SUl\1SION AND PARK
80 North 100 East

Provo, Utah 84601

Attorneys for DefendantsR espondents

